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Abstract: Botnets are considered as the primary threats on the Internet and there have been many research efforts to detect and mitigate them. Today, Botnet uses a 
DNS technique fast-flux to hide malware sites behind a constantly changing network of compromised hosts. This technique is similar to trustworthy Round Robin DNS 
technique and Content Delivery Network (CDN). In order to distinguish the normal network traffic from Botnets different techniques are developed with more or less 
success. The aim of this paper is to improve Botnet detection using an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) or router. A novel classification method for online Botnet detection 
based on DNS traffic features that distinguish Botnet from CDN based traffic is presented. Botnet features are classified according to the possibility of usage and 
implementation in an embedded system. Traffic response is analysed as a strong candidate for online detection. Its disadvantage lies in specific areas where CDN acts as 
a Botnet. A new feature based on search engine hits is proposed to improve the false positive detection. The experimental evaluations show that proposed classification 
could significantly improve Botnet detection. A procedure is suggested to implement such a system as a part of IDS. 
 





The Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical 
naming system for computers, services, clients, or any 
resource connected to the Internet. It provides a critical 
Internet service of mapping between two principal name 
spaces on the Internet: DNS tree and Internet protocol 
logical address space. DNS system is one of the 
unavoidable components of the critical infrastructure 
of the Internet as it makes possible to assign human-
friendly names into logical Internet protocol addresses 
[1]. Maintaining consistency in handling names is one of 
the most important tasks in increasingly frequent changes 
of IP addresses due to widespread usage of dynamic DNS 
techniques. 
Resolution, caching system and tree like organization 
provide the fault-tolerance ability for the DNS [2]. This 
fault-tolerance can help specific services to achieve 
availability by load distribution. The most often used 
example for this type of service is a web service. In this 
case, redundancy can be achieved if multiple web servers 
with the same web content are made available. This 
solution is named Round Robin DNS (RRDNS) [3]. In 
the case of the Round Robin algorithm for every DNS 
query a client is redirected to a different web server. -
Time to live on authoritative DNS server decides when 
the redirection address for the web server will be changed. 
The main advantage of RRNDS is load redistribution 
between multiple servers. 
To provide faster response time to the client by 
shortening network path from client to the server an 
Authoritative DNS server exploits Content Delivery 
Network (CDN) concept [4, 5]. In CDN concept every 
website is served on multiple web servers positioned 
around the globe. Using the previously established data 
about network connectivity upon client query for address, 
system responds using the server that has the smallest 
Round Trip Time [6]. Decision can be further improved 
by monitoring multiple servers. For instance, by 
examining server load or possible active threats. In case 
of Denial of Service attack (DoS) on one of the servers, 
others can provide content. Due to scattered network 
locations DoS attack against the web site becomes very 
difficult as it must be effective on every server in the field 
[7, 8]. 
This solution, as it is extremely usable for legitimate 
sites, it can also be exploited to compromised sites. A 
compromised computer, called bot, lies in the 
compromised network under control of a Botmaster [9]. 
Botmaster is assigning tasks over the network to the 
compromised computer or even mobile device.  The 
communication between bots and Botmaster server plays 
a vital role in maintaining a Botnet’s existence. Botnet is 
useless without the communication channel as they 
cannot join the bots’ army and receive instructions and 
timing for the next goal of the Botmaster [10]. 
Obstructing the communication channel between bot and 
Botmaster can lead to rapid decrease of bot population 
and can result in failed malicious attack. In case of Denial 
of Service attack number of active bots guarantees a 
successful attack [11-12]. 
Botnets are continuously widening the approach in 
finding new infiltration communication channels. In the 
past, most popular channel of the attack was the Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC) protocol, which enabled a two-way 
communication between the bot and the Botmaster. To 
deliver the mission parameters only one-way 
communication is sufficient. An example of the 
Botmaster direction can be a post on a webpage, a blog 
post, a Facebook post, a Twitter tweet or even an updated 
Facebook status. Text can be obfuscated with a simple 
cryptography like the Caesar cipher or by a more complex 
algorithm. The message can be hidden in picture 
description or in a hidden part of a webpage [13]. 
To be able to communicate with Botnet every bot has 
to have predefined communication channels. They have to 
be integrated into the bot code. A hard-coded list of IP 
addresses can be easily blacklisted. A stealthier way to 
maintain the communication channel has to be used to 
prevent detection of Botnet. Today, DNS techniques can 
be used as a flexible way of contacting the Botmasters. 
The most common methods are fast-flux and domain flux 
[14]. 
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The fast-flux or IP-flux method can be described as 
rapid and repeated changes of logical address in the DNS 
record. Even in some cases rapid and repeated changes of 
logical address of the name server for the domain in a 
DNS. New name server logical address in most cases 
implies change of logical address of the host as a new 
record is used. The rapid change is done by setting a short 
Time to Live (TTL) for a stored logical address and by 
changing the appropriate DNS record frequently. This 
technique is legally used for a long time as a load 
balancing method for heavy duty servers (web sites and 
search engines). In the legitimate use, the goal is to 
distribute the load over multiple servers and to try to 
dedicate the nearest network server to the client and thus 
decrease network Round Trip Time. 
In Botnets this technique is used to form a Fast-flux 
service network, a network made by compromised hosts 
sharing the same domain name. The logical addresses are 
rapidly swapped based on availability and bandwidth. 
There can even be a load distribution scheme that 
employs particular hosts to check the health of other bots 
in the Botnet. With a rapid change of the logical addresses 
blacklisting as a technique is obsolete. Recognizing and 
blacklisting the one percent of the million hosts Botnet 
has become impossible. One available option is to 
suspend the domain name, but this is a complex task as 
most of the Botnets use registrars that are resistant to 
blocking of domain names [15]. 
Another advantage of using the Fast-flux is the 
gained anonymity of the main Botnet command centre. 
Fast flux bots become proxy server redirecting the traffic 
and ensuring to disrupt every attempt to track and reveal 
the identities of the Botnet command centre. This 
increases a lifetime of the Botnet command centre and 
makes is easier to set up and manage a compromised 
network. 
To detect Fast-flux and Domain-flux techniques and 
thus the existence of a bot in a local network a passive or 
active analysis of the DNS traffic has to be executed. It 
can be assumed that in the monitored traffic, some of the 
users are infected with malicious content and that some 
malware components will be running on monitored 
systems. These components are likely to contact 
malicious domains. Malicious domains can be 
distinguished by studying public malware domain lists 
and spam blacklists. The goal is to detect patterns in DNS 
traffic that can be redirected to Intrusion Detection 
System or Intrusion Prevention System to detect and 
disable bots in local networks [18]. 
In active and passive DNS monitoring, multiple 
features can be monitored. In most active monitoring 
systems, a Botmaster can detect an attempt to detect a bot. 
Passive monitoring mostly requires addition time and 
records to make a decision. Every feature can provide 
additional information in making a decision about bot 
existence. A difficult part is to create an algorithm to join 
multiple feature measurements and to provide a detection 
threshold to make a correct decision. Some features can 
be obstructed by Botmaster in adapting bot behaviour. As 
the detection mechanism is most likely to be a part of the 
embedded system like IDS system or plug in on a router, 
performance becomes an issue because of limited 
processing power and memory availability. Due to these 
issues, a focus was made on features that can be classified 
upon the possibility of real time usage and by processing 
power and memory usage [16=18]. 
In this paper, Botnet adaptation issues are explored 
and the most frequently used features were measured. 
After this step, the best features were selected according 
to their behaviour, real time performance and possibility 
of application in embedded systems. An additional new 
feature is proposed to improve the Botnet detection 
success. The solution is verified on known inputs: 
legitimate sites and Botnets. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows; 
the related work in this field is presented in the next 
section. Section 3 presents the overview of the online bot 
detection features based on document fetch delay. A 
proposed new feature based on search engines behaviour 
is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 provides a 
classification algorithm used for decision about bot 
existence with actual data examples. Finally, Section 6 
describes conclusion and future work. 
 
2 RELATED WORK 
 
In first paper in this field T. Holz et al. presented 
characteristics of Fast-flux service network and proposed 
a first technique to detect a bot in a local network [19]. 
The paper proposed a method of weighed linear 
regression to assign a flux-score to a domain. The 
regression function is a linear and made up from three 
components derived from the DNS: number of unique A 
records, number of a distinct autonomous system numbers 
(ASN) and number of unique NS records. 
E.Passerini et al. developed a program FLUXOR that 
uses nine features to detect the existence of the 
compromised network [20]. The nine features are: domain 
age, place of registration of the domain (country), number 
of unique records address, time of life Namespace records 
(TTL), the number of different networks, the number of 
different autonomous systems, the number of different 
full domain names obtained by the inverse query, the 
number of different organization owner and a number of 
different network names assigned by the registry. The 
system consists of three modules: the collector, the 
discoverer and supervisor. Some features are not 
applicable in the real time and thus the system cannot 
make instantaneous or quick decisions. 
R. Perdisci and other suggests a passive network 
monitoring through the reduction of traffic observed 
within a time period [21]. The features that are used are: 
the number of unique records address, domain name, time 
of life of the namespace record, the diversity of the 
individual  network prefix, the number of domains in the 
network, the rate of growth of unique network addresses, 
diversity of the autonomous system, diversity of the 
prefix routing protocol (BGP), diversity of the 
organization which belongs to a network, diversity of 
network at origin country, the number of dynamic IP 
addresses (prefix ADSL, DIAL-UP), availability on the 
network. The same author [22] also publishes similar 
paper with different features (DNS time to live, frequency 
of IP change, number of resolved IP, scattered IP over 
several networks). 
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J. Nazario and T. Holz continued the study further by 
combining previously established features (the number of 
unique record address, diversity of network records and 
diversity of autonomous system) with new features - the 
defined retry time in the authoritative server in different 
autonomous systems [23]. Additional inquiries enabled 
the visibility of the research by the compromised network. 
Moreover, in their work it is possible to adapt the network 
to use a smaller number of different servers. 
X. Hu, M. and K. Shin Knysz developed the tool 
called Digger which may determine the existence of a 
network of compromised computers [24]. In their work, 
they rely on features such as the number of unique 
addresses, the rate of growth in the number of unique 
records addresses, time of availability of the network 
address, and the overlap between the network address 
between domains. Due to the analysis of the growth rate 
as well as the determination of overlapping addresses in 
the domain, these features are not usable in real time. 
X, Hu, M. Knysz and K. Shinn developed a tool 
called "RB-seeker" [25]. Their tool uses the following 
features: the number of unique records address, the rate of 
growth in the number of unique addresses, the diversity of 
autonomous systems, the rate of growth in the number of 
different autonomous systems and inverse name 
associated with the network address. Based on analysis of 
characteristics that are based on the grow rate it is evident 
that the system cannot work in real time. Furthermore, 
additional tests can alert the network of compromised 
computers. 
S. Marchal, et al. in their work suggest the following 
features: the number of unique records address, the rate of 
growth in the number of unique addresses, time of life of 
the records, the number of unique records of name servers 
address as well as additional features related to the 
domain name: similarity of the domain names with the 
dictionary, the similarity of certain elements of the 
domain with valid domain names [26]. The work has 
proposed a new concept for the evaluation of the domain 
name. Unfortunately, a dictionary must be provided for all 
languages and additional words should be entered to 
cover novel computer terms. 
L. Bilgi, E. Kirda, C. Krueger, M. Balduzzi propose a 
tool called Exposure [27]. Exposure is using the following 
features: availability of a domain, daily similarity in 
behaviour, repetitive patterns of behaviour and the 
frequency of access, number of different addresses, 
different countries for these addresses, the number of 
different domains with which they share the same 
address, an average lifetime on name server, standard 
deviation of the lifetime between addresses, the count of 
numbers in the domain name and the percentage of the 
length of the longest part of the domain name with 
meaning. The system cannot work in real time as it uses 
comparisons with the past data points. 
L. Jehyun, K. Jonghun, S. Hyo-Jeongand L. Hijo 
propose an analysis of network address and grouping of 
links addresses with domains [28]. This technique 
requires an analysis of the data obtained in the past as 
well as high traffic out to identify the similarities between 
the behaviour of the observed domain. 
H. Ching-Hsiang, H. Chun Ying and C. Kuan-Ta 
introduce a new feature based on measurement of 
response time of the domain [29]. A characteristic feature 
is applicable in real time and does not require significant 
resources for memory and processing power. There is a 
problem with legitimate domains, which have no needs to 
achieve fast response in local segments where it is 
installed. For example, a local significant portal response 
time achieved from a distant geographical location. 
S. Yadav, et al. analyses DNS traffic by looking for 
patterns inherent to domain names that are generated 
algorithmically, in contrast to those generated by humans. 
Distribution of alphanumeric characters and bigrams 
mapped to the same set of IP addresses is analysed [30]. 
This method cannot be used in real time as it is based on 
statistical analysis. In addition, there is a problem with 
CDN as they are also using similar domain names wide 
across the Internet. 
O. Pomorova, et al. propose the method that takes 
into account abnormal behaviours of the hosts' group, 
which are similar to Botnets: hosts' group has small DNS 
TTL and carry out the DNS-queries to non-local DNS-
servers. The method monitors a large number of empty 
DNS-responses with error code [31]. Using this 
technique, there is a high rate of success. However, the 
method uses a complex algorithm not suited for 
embedded system. Furthermore, there is a problem when 
compromised computer detects a Mothership in a few 
attempts, which is available in a longer period. In that 
case, a Botnet cannot be detected. 
Kwon J. et al. propose a complex system that 
analyses DNS traffic more systematically by scaling it 
down. A tool called PsyBoG is developed for detecting 
malicious behaviour within large volumes of DNS traffic 
[33]. PsyBoG leverages a signal processing technique, 
power spectral density (PSD) analysis, to discover the 
major frequencies resulting from the periodic DNS 
queries of Botnets. This solution is not applicable in real 
time as it requires post processing. Additionally, traffic 
patterns have to be isolated to verify the correct Botnet 
behaviour in the network. Tab. 1 presents the Botnet 
detection feature references. For each feature additional 
fields present applicability in real time, availability to 
detect examination, to adapt to avoid detection, 
processing and memory requirements in embedded 
system environment is identified. 
Real time applicability in first column is described as 
suitable (Yes), can be achieved (Can) and impossible 
(No). Second and third columns describe Botmaster 
availability to detect and to adapt as fully adoptable or 
detectable (Yes), can be achieved in small portion (Can) 
and undetectable or unadaptable (No). Last two columns 
classify embedded system requirements as small (Small), 
medium (Medium) and large (Large) in a sense of 
processing power and memory requirements. 
 
3 EVALUATION OF FEATURE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
To estimate different features described in Tab. 1 an 
experimental evaluation was accomplished using diverse 
sources for domain names. 
The first source represents legitimate domains that 
are the most common in general use. For this purpose, we 
used top 500 mostly used domains according to Alexa top 
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sites web page [34]. This set of data is collected during 
the one-year period and it is referred as DCDN. 
Well-known database of Botnet inflicted domains 
was the second source. As this source, fast-flux Botnets 
and phish domains were used according to gathered data 
on Botnet trackers during one-year period [35-47]. The 
second source set of data is referred to as DBOT.  
Additionally, we used internal IDS logs from 
University of Applied Sciences, Zagreb. IDL logs 
collected in a period of one year were pre-processed and 
stored in the database. These logs provided the mostly 
used locally significant domain names. This set of data 
was manually classified to provide DCDN’ and DBOT’ sets. 
 
Table 1 Botnet detection features 









F1 Availability of the domain in the time period  [20, 21, 27] No No No Medium Large 
F2 Place of domain registration (country)  [20] Yes No Yes Small Small 
F3 Number of subdomains in the domain [26] Yes No Yes Medium Large 
F4 The domain name according to dictionary [26, 30, 32] Yes No Can Large Small 
F5 The similarity of certain elements of the domain name with a valid domain 
name [26, 30, 33] 
Yes No Yes Medium Large 
F6 Numbers in domain names [27] Yes No Yes Small Small 
F7 The length of the longest word in the domain name [27] Yes No Yes Small Small 
F8 Number and duration of the connection [26] No No Yes Large Large 
F9 Similar daily behavior of the domain [27, 32] No No Yes Large Large 
F10 Recurring cycles of query to the authoritative server [28] No No Yes Large Large 
F11 Number of unique address records [19-27, 33] Yes No Yes Small Small 
F12 The rate of growth in the number of unique network address [21, 22, 24, 25, 
33] 
Can No Can Medium Large 
F13 Time of life for the network address in name server [24, 31] Can No Can Medium Large 
F14 Diversity of network address for returned records on request [20-23, 31, 33] Yes No No Small Small 
F15 The diversity of autonomous system returned from query [19, 20, 21, 23, 25] No No No Medium Small 
F16 The rate of growth in the number of different autonomous systems [25] Can No No Medium Small 
F17 A number of different full domain names obtained on request for inverse 
network address [20, 21, 27] 
Yes Yes No Medium Small 
F18 Global name given for registering autonomous system [20] Yes No Can Medium Small 
F19 A number of different organizations that owns the network [20] Yes No Can Medium Small 
F20 Number of different countries which belongs to the network [21, 27] Yes No Can Medium Small 
F21 Reverse name for the network address [21, 25] Yes Yes Can Medium Large 
F22 Allowed retry time in name server [23] Yes No Can Small Small 
F23 Time of life for the record in name server [20-23, 26, 27, 31] Yes No Can Small Small 
F24 Network latency domain and document retrieval time [29] Yes No No Medium Small 
F25 Calculation of processing time on the server [29] Yes Yes No Medium Small 
F26 The ratio of network delay and processing time on the server [29] Yes Yes No Medium Small 
F27 Number of unique records address of the name servers [19, 23, 26] Can Yes Can Medium Medium 
F28 Number of different autonomous systems address of the name servers [23] Can Yes Can Medium Medium 
F29  The overlap between the network address and the name server address [24] Yes Yes No Medium Medium 
 
The summary set of data used for experimental setup 
is given by: 
 
CDN BOT CDN BOTD D D D' D'= + + +                               (1) 
 
The goal of experimental evaluation was to determine 
suitable features for embedded system implementation. 
The aim is to achieve as little processing power and 
memory needed for implementation into the embedded 
system. 
Tool set was developed to measure all features from 
Tab. 1 daily. Every feature described in Tab. 1 was 
implemented as a separate tool. Additional tool was 
developed to upgrade the sources whose execution was a 
prerequisite for other tools. Toolset was started daily 
during a period of one year. Obtained results were stored 
in database and analysed after the experiment evaluation 
period has ended. 
Measurements have shown that the best results in 
proportion to the feasibility of real-time and embedded 
environment implementation advantages has a feature F26 
-the ratio of network delay and processing time on the 
server according to Tab. 1 [29]. 
 
 
Figure 1 Fast-flux communication between client and the mothership 
 
In fast-flux Botnets the most important concept is the 
protection of the main command server from disclosure. 
By discovering and blocking the main command server 
the whole network of compromised computers becomes 
non-operational. To prevent this, Botnet network 
architecture relies on the existence of a large number of 
proxy servers (i.e. intermediary computers) that are a 
bridge in communication between one or more main 
command servers and the compromised client. Fig. 1 
presents an example of proxy server communication 
between client and the mothership. Client sends a request 
to the proxy server that creates a new communication to 
the mothership. Mothership is under the control of 
Botmaster. The role of the mothership is to manage the 
compromised computers and decide which content and 
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when is to be served to the clients. When mothership 
answers, the response is forwarded to the client. 
In case of Content Distribution Networks, which 
represent the legitimate domain, the concept of reliable 
serving architecture is the same as in Botnets. However, 
the main computer server has more computational power 
with faster response times on a faster network, and in 
most cases optimized for the network on which it 
advertises. In this scenario, the domain server advertises a 
unique address that is optimized for the location of the 
request. 
In Botnets optimization for the location is hard to  
achieve and even in some cases not possible. Botnet 
proxy computers are primarily selected according to 
stability, availability on the network and not by the 
response time of the local network. In [29] H. Ching-
Hsiang, H. Chun-Ying and C. Kuan-Ta propose a 
comparison  of the ratio of document fetch time on correct 
upper layer protocol request, and document fetch time on 
incorrect upper layer protocol request to detect the 
existence of  Botnet in real-time. Fig. 2 presents structure 
of estimated network delay. 
Estimated network delay is defined as the time 
needed for a minimal low level communication. In the 
communication protocol (TCP) client sends a request 
(SYN packet) for communication to the server. The server 
responds confirming receipt of the request (SYN ACK). 
In other words, estimated network delay is defined as the 




Figure 2 Estimated network delay, estimated document fetch delay and 
estimated processing delay 
 
Opposite to estimated network delay on low level 
protocol, estimated document delay on high level protocol 
is larger. This time is defined as the time from when an 
initial high level protocol request for communication is 
sent to retrieve web pages, as in HTTP GET request, 
(SYN request, followed by the higher layers of the HTTP 
GET request) and the time when the response came for 
communication to the higher layer protocol (HTTP 
response). This time delay is subtracted by the estimated 
network delay to obtain an estimated document fetch 
delay. 
To determine the distance between proxy server and 
the main computer server, a deliberate incorrect 
application request is sent in a higher protocol. It this case 
HTTP HI is used instead of HTTP GET. Proxy server will 
recognize faulty request in a higher protocol and will 
refuse the connection without referring it to the main 
server. It is assumed that in case of compromised network 
proxy, computers would be slow (link and processing 
power) and the distance between an intermediary 
computer and the host server will not be optimized. If 
both these parameters are increasing, it is safe to assume 
that a request is made on the compromised network. 
Conversely, if both parameters incline to zero then it is 
the indication of a CDN. 
Feature  F26 requires additional request in a form of 
an incorrect higher protocol request be sent to the network 
domain under examination. This request can be 
recognized by the Botnet administrator and logged on the 
administrator owned proxy server. To avoid this, a 
random generated incorrect request words can be used 
and, in addition, a database can be employed to exhaust 
historical results to avoid new queries. Other information, 
such as network latency and document retrieval time, is 
obtained by measuring the activity on the link. However, 
these activities are not visible to the Botnet administrator. 
The advantage of using feature F26 is the inability to 
avoid detection by interfering in Botnet network. When 
choosing a proxy server in a Botnet the emphasis is on 
stability and availability. It is not necessary to improve 
response time from all peers on a local network. Even if 
the compromised network computers began to optimize 
the response speed, the number of available stable 
compromised computer cannot guarantee the response 
time that can be achieved in optimized CDN. 
The disadvantage of this feature is the similar 
behaviour for networks that have no interest for some 
regional area. For example, some specific newspaper 
domain does not have to be optimized for speed in 
geographically distant domains. This site can use CDN 
and thus a Botnet can be recognized. The site will have 
multiple network addresses and for all addresses, a slow 
connection for proxy server is determined. It is expected 
that a percentage of these errors will be small. In the 
future, we expect an increase in a number of CDN and 
their nodes to further enable reliable operation and 
optimization in connectivity with local networks [29]. Our 
experimental evaluation was conducted on the Croatian 
local network. Due to this reason, the percentage of these 
errors is not to be neglected. 
In Fig. 3 measurement of feature 26 is presented. The 
horizontal axis represents an estimated document fetch 
delay in milliseconds, while the vertical axis is an 
estimated processing delay also in milliseconds. Rounded 
grey points are known CDN domains and cross black 
points are Botnets or phishing domains. Tab. 2 presents 
minimal, average and maximal data point presented in 
Fig. 3. 
There is a significant overlap in dot positioning. In 
Fig. 3 most of the presented wrong classifications are 
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based on lack of optimization for CDN domain web site 
due to the uninteresting market. These web sites can be 
unavailable to this market or not available in native 




Figure 3 Ratio of estimated document fetch delay with estimated processing 
delay (F26) 
 
Table 2 Minimum, average and maximum points in Fig. 3 
Point CDN Botnet 
Minimum (0,006, 0,021) (0,020, 0,041) 
Average (0,119, 0,292) (0,211, 0,330) 
Maximum (0,313, 0,947) (0,984, 0,981) 
 
4 CLASSIFICATION IMPROVEMENT BASED ON SEARCH 
HITS 
 
To improve the classification of results by decreasing 
the error rate for a particular local area a new feature is 
proposed. 
Feature F4 empowers corrections based on the 
domain name by performing a similarity check against the 
database of known words from a controlled dictionary 
[26]. This feature has several significant shortcomings. In 
an embedded system implementation, a large memory is 
needed to store the dictionary of all known words. As 
domain names are not related only to the English 
language, other dictionaries also must be available. 
Another issue that is not covered by dictionaries is 
specific words or abbreviations like "www", "eBay", 
"PayPal" although they are very common as legitimate 
domains in the Internet domain. Thus, dictionaries should 
be expanded to accommodate such abbreviations. 
Search engines clearly recognize different domain 
names and words from domain names that have 
significance in today's computing world. They support 
multiple languages as all countries and languages together 
create a search tree. For example, word "eBay" in most 
dictionaries will be unknown, but search engines will 
result in a large number of hits. However, in some 
countries, eBay is not available as a stand-alone site, and 
thus the domain speed optimization is not a concern to 
clients. 
Utilizing ideas covered by F4 concept, a new feature 
based on the domain name according to search engines is 
proposed. This new feature named search engines credit 
worthiness is referred as F30. This feature is based on 
search engine hits returned by a domain name to establish 
if behind the domain is a Botnet.  This new feature is used 
to improve classification introduced by F26 in Fig. 3. 
Every domain name is built with words separated by 
the full stop. The last word describes the largest tree part 
where this domain resides. This part of the domain is 
from the pool of available branches in DNS tree. Every 
word from this pool can be assigned to the compromised 
or regular domain. However, there are words in this pool 
that have greater potential to be used in the compromised 
domain. An example would be a country where digital 
criminal acts are not regulated and the prosecution of this 
crime is rare. An algorithm for the feature F30 should 
eliminate common last word used in regular domains. 
The first word in the domain name can also be 
common as it often describes a service that is behind a 
domain name. Examples of the common first words 
would be: www, shop, webmail. Due to this requirement, 
the feature F30 should eliminate common first words. 
To achieve elimination of the common first and last 
word two new sets of known words are created: P (Prefix) 
and S (Suffix). P and S are created upon the database of 
known regular sites. An example would be an Alexa top 
sites list [30]. These domain names are introduced as set 
L. 
There are m domain names verified as regular domain 
L={L1,...,Lx,...,Lm}. For every Domain name from a set  
Lx, a list of words is created, where n is the length of the 










                                                              (2) 
 
A list of known regular prefixes 
P'={l{0,0]...l{x,0]...l{m,0]] and suffixes  S'={l{0,n]...l{x,n]...l{m,n]] 






















                                                    (4) 
 
Every subset contains the same elements and all the 
intersections between subsets make an empty set (3) (4). 
As there are common words it is expected that u<<m and 
v<<m. 




x uP P P                                                          (5) 
0 ,..., ,...,
'' '' ''
x uS S S                                                           (6) 
 
An average cardinality is calculated for sets P" and 
S": |P''|avg and |S''|avg. 
Finally, sets P and S are constructed from words (one 
element in subset) that are in subsets that have larger 
cardinality than average cardinality of all subsets. It is 
expected that cardinality of the P and S set would be 
smaller than u and v. 
To measure F30 an algorithm is implemented. 
Domain data is used from a conducted experimental 
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evaluation described in Section 3. For every Domain D, a 








= ∑                                                                        (7) 
 
First element d0 is compared to every element of set 
P. If P contains element d0 then d0 is removed from a set 
D: 
 
0 0{ } \{ }d P D d∈ →                                                        (8) 
 
Last element dn is compared to every element of set S. 
If S contains element dn then dn is removed from set D: 
 
{ } \{ }n nd S D d∈ →                                                        (9) 
 
For each remaining word in set D (di) a credit 
worthiness R is examined in the search engine. The final 







R d R R R
n =
= = ∪∑                                       (10) 
 
If the result R is greater than an estimated detection 
threshold, the domain is declared normal. If the amount is 
smaller, domain is declared potentially compromised. 
Threshold can be determined by introducing learning set 
of domains RCDN and RBOT according to known 
classification from sources introduced in Section 3. Fig. 4 
presents credit worthiness R of the domain according to 
data source: DCND and DBOT. The detection threshold 
determination is discussed later in Section 5. X-axis 
shows the arithmetic mean of all the words in the domain 
(R) and y-axis is the number of domains that have similar 
result in percentage. The grey line corresponds to known 
CDN domains, the black line represents known Botnets, 
fast-flux Botnets and known phishing sites. As a range of 




Figure 4 Credit worthiness R 
 
Detailed inspection of credit worthiness shows that 
certain common domains deviate from the expected credit 
worthiness of search engines. In this case, it is hard to 
determine a stable detection threshold value to positively 
detect Botnets. Measurement results were used and all 
regular domains that reside next to the proposed detection 
threshold were examined to improve classification. These 
results are creating a false negative pattern in F30. 
Additional intervention is needed to decrease false 
negative results. Inspection of obtained results revealed 
that border domain which triggers improper classification 
could be narrowed into three groups: 
1) Companies that are not primarily oriented on Internet; 
2) Domains that are not primarily used for browsing; 
3) Adult content domain. 
 
Companies like a marketing agency are oriented to 
their businesses and they used website to present their 
portfolio to the future client. They offer list of services, 
recommendations and a contact page. This kind of 
specialized sites is not visited by a large number of 
visitors. However, most search engines will recognize 
them as a legitimate company and offer a contact info on 
a search page or "more results on" link under the search 
result. An example would be www.glipsa.com 
representing a renowned marketing agency bit the term 
"glispa" provides less than 200000 hits. 
There are domains that are used to offer special 
services to the clients. Services are served through the 
application programming interface offered on domain 
(web services) [48]. An example might be domain 
www.mycalendarbook.com that provides services to other 
sites or mobile devices while using the network with 
trusted serving to make API available and load balanced. 
The website is very simple and thereby provides low 
credit worthiness to a search engine. 
These are the usual sites with legitimate content that 
search engines intentionally degrade [49]. Such domain 
names yield poorer results compared to terms that are not 
linked to adult content sites. Some search engines mark 
these results as adult content. When this marking is not 
available it is possible to rely on Meta tag of the site. 
Adult content page uses a specific Meta tag that indicates 
that it hosts adult content [50]. 
To further distinguish results and provide a better 
detection threshold between regular and compromised 
domain false negative sites must be eliminated. These are 
the usual sites with legitimate content that search engines 
intentionally degrade. Such domain names yield inferior 
results compared to terms that are not linked to. The 
answer lies in additional observation gained from a search 
engine: 
1) Search engine offers a contact data about company 
2) Search engine offers "more results…" about site 
3) Search engine declares "adult content" or an adequate 
meta tag is found 
 
Indication that domain is a legitimate site can be if 
Google has recognized a company that is behind these 
sites and search results offer a small box next to results 
with the company details (owner, address, working hours, 
street view) [51]. If these data are provided introduced 
variable named company box recognized -Xc 
becomes 1. 
If a link "more results for ..." appear in webpage with 
the partitioning of main domain into sections, we could 
say that this domain is complex or recognized by the 
search engine [52]. This verifies existence of a domain 
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name for a longer period. If this data is provided a 
variable named long domain existence recognized Xr 
becomes 1. 
Some search engines mark adult content due to 
parenting guidance policy. In lack of these markings, a 
site page is loaded and searched for tag "adult content" or 
over 18 warnings [50]. Such sites are intentionally 
degraded on search engines. If such tags are indeed 
present a variable named adult content 
recognized -Xp becomes 1. 
By introducing additional data in decision conclusion 
F30 becomes enhanced. The result gained by the search 
engine hits is corrected by a factor that employs 
additional information obtained from search engine: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )E c c r r p pR R X F X F X F= + ∗ + ∗ + ∗                  (11) 
 
Factors Fc, Fr, Fp are determined by using a known 
set of regular domains. In this paper by using known set 
of learning domains these factors are determined to be 10. 
In Fig. 5 enhanced credit worthiness RE is presented. 
Upon applying correction factors Fc, Fr, Fp an improved 




Figure 5 Enhanced credit worthiness RE 
 
The proposed algorithm is appropriate for 
implementation in embedded system environment 
because it can be executed in real time without the 
necessity of additional memory like a dictionary or black 
list of words.. Additional calls to search engines and 
result examination require medium processing power. 
The search engine testing is not visible by the Botnet 
administrator. Subsequently, Botnet administrator cannot 
verify that a detection is in progress. As search engines 
have their own databases maintained by specific spider 
routines, there is no possibility for Botnet administrators 
to significantly improve the domain hits. Small local 
domains just by longer existence would improve their 
hits. For example, other users will mention the domain on 
a forum, blog or social network and number of hits will 
rise. Since Botnet domains are new, they are quickly 
extinguished, rarely mentioned on blogs, forums and 
social networks and thus the number of hits will be low. 
To make a proper classification a detection threshold 
should be determined. Using the data from the survey 
detection threshold can be determined since for each 
output (the number of hits that the search engine is a one-
dimensional number), a decision is obtained from a 
learning set. Ideal detection threshold could be found if 
the sets could be classifiable, since in such cases the 
detection threshold can be clearly defined. 
However, it is likely to expect that sets will not be 
directly classifiable. The problem of the classification 
error is that they are either positive or negative. Positive 
error is if the CDN domain is recognized as a Botnet. The 
negative error is if the Botnet is recognized as CDN. 
To determine the detection threshold, it is possible to 
apply the following solutions: 1) set the detection 
threshold so that there is an equal number of the positive 
and negative errors, or 2) set the detection threshold so 
that there are only positive or only negative errors. 
Positive errors are less problematic than negative errors. 
The safest solution is to set detection threshold over 
the last recognized Botnet. Fig 6. presents details of the 
critical region where detection threshold is to be 
determined. There exists an overlapping area between 
points A and B that covers both CDNs and Botnets. It is 
necessary to choose the detection threshold to point B just 
above the last recognized Botnet. By selecting this 
detection threshold, a positive error is noted: 0.49% 




Figure 6 Overlapping CDN and Botnet detection. Enlarged portion of Fig. 5 
presenting enhanced credit worthiness RE. 
 
In a critical case, a Botnet can adapt its behaviour to 
bluff the results. It is possible only to the certain extent. In 
most registries, a Botnet will not be able to register a 
name that is very similar to a frequently used name (e.g. 
Paypol). Even in the event of successful registration small 
insignificant change in name affects significant influence 
on credit worthiness obtained by the search engine (e.g. 
PayPal in Google: 540 million, Bing: 19.5 million; 
Paypol in Google: 29.800, Bing: 90.400). 
It can be concluded that enhanced F30 cannot 
positively decide whether the domain is a part of Botnet. 
This is expected as none of the features described in Table 
I can make autonomous decision. To make a decision 
multiple features have to be combined as stated in related 
work section. 
 
5 THRESHOLD DECISION ALGORITHM 
 
Neither F26 nor enhanced F30 are able to 
successfully classify CDN from Botnet. To be able to 
make classification a new approach is suggested. Decision 
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algorithm is proposed based on usage of F26 and 
enhanced F30 feature. Feature  F26 returns a decimal 
number representing document retrieval time, with the 
meaning of the response to a proper request made by 
higher layer protocol, and processing time as the response 
to a faulty request made by higher layer protocol. The 
feature F30 returns decision as binary data. All domains 
with the number of hits less than the detection threshold 
value are classified as Botnet controlled domains, while 
all other domains whose hits are greater than the detection 
threshold are considered to be hosted by the CDN. 
Combining these two features improves the classification. 
A summarization will increase the decimal number 
value by the average network delay of 0.25ms for all 
domains that were declared as Botnet based on the feature 
F30. For domains that the feature F30 recognized as CDN 
their decimal values of the feature F26 will be decreased 
by the value of the average network delay [53]. 
The data is classified into two sets. The first set is a 
CDN and the second set is a Botnet.  Both sets are 
processed using Sequential Minimal Optimization 
algorithm (SMO) to obtain the classification function with 
Support Vector Machine [53]. 
Applying the classification function SMO with both 
sets of data as inputs on WEKA tool [54] a result in a 
decision function is represented by linear equation: 
 
9713.004.01754.6 =− yx                                      (12) 
 
Fig. 7 presents a summarized result of F26 and F30 
feature and classification function. WEKA tool 
successfully calculated unambiguous classification of 
both sets. Table III presents minimum, average and 
maximum data points to confirm successful classification. 
In Fig. 7 some domains ended in negative values. 
Since a network latency is contained in the feature F26, 
subtracting the average network delay significantly affects 
the domains that were faster in response (i.e. have less 
delay than the average). Domains that already had an 
average delay will end around the zero value. 
 
 
Figure 7 Threshold decision 
 
Table 3 Minimum, average and maximum points in Fig. 7 
Point CDN Botnet 
Minimum (-0,243, -0,228) (0,270, 0,291) 
Average (-0,130, 0,042) (0,461, 0,580) 
Maximum (0,063, 0,697) (1,234, 1,231) 
 
Critical domains served by CDN are those that are 
visible on the graph around zero or with a greater value. 
These domains were very slow in the local network where 
the measure was taken. There could be several 
commonplace explanations for such slow response times. 
For example, these points could represent distant domains 
that do not have an interest to provide higher speeds in 
our measured environment. 
Classification function presented by (12) need to be 
adjusted to accommodate a specific period or a device 
geographic location, since it is expected that the CDN will 
react different if the local network is changed. To 
establish a new classification a learning set should be 
used with known CDN and Botnets. The same learning 
set can be used regardless of the location of embedded 
systems since the enhanced F30 adjusts the F26 result. As 
enhanced F30 uses search engine result it will have the 
same result undependable of embedded system location. 
F26 is dependable upon embedded system geographic 
location as it is based on network delay. Thus a 
recommendation is to build a new detection threshold 
upon learning set upon embedded system change location. 
If a simple linear function is not possible to be 
obtained by Sequential Minimal Optimization methods of 
approximation, a more complex linear function will be 
yielded. In this case, it is expected that a false positive 
and false negative error will be introduced. In a case of 
false positive or false negative, identified problematic 
nodes should be analysed to determine the cause of wrong 
classification.  For example, the input data declared as 
CDN picked up from the website that states it as the most 
common domain can contain domains that serve Botnets. 




In this paper, a new Botnet detection algorithm is 
proposed based on two features that are hard to adapt by a 
Botnet. Document fetch delay detects the proxy existence 
in document retrieval process. Primary goal of a CDN is 
to improve the fetch delay to become more available.  
Contrary, the primary goal of the Botnet is availability. 
Botnet does not control compromised computers and thus 
a better candidate for a proxy is compromised computer 
which was most available in recent time. This makes a 
CND distinguishable from a Botnet. Unfortunately, some 
geographic places, which are not of interest to the web 
site owner, do not require speed optimization. This can 
lead to a false positive where the CDN domain would be 
recognized as Botnet. 
To improve classification an additional feature should 
be determined. A solution based on domain name analysis 
is proposed. Domain name analysis is based on the 
assumption that legitimate sites are using legitimate 
dictionary words. Botnets to avoid detection are using 
very similar words to those in dictionaries. It is difficult 
for Botnets to use legitimate words because most domains 
are occupied and the registrars check the names according 
to their digital security policies. By using an English 
dictionary our detection algorithm is limited to the 
English language domain. To introduce additional 
languages available memory resources and the search 
efficiency become an issue.  
New feature similar to dictionaries based on the 
search engine credit worthiness is proposed. To 
distinguish CDN and Botnet domains a domain words 
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number of search engine hits is analysed. Additionally, 
feature is improved by analysing additional information 
about domain obtained from search engine results. 
Geographic location is no longer an issue as search hits 
are similar from different locations. Botnets are constantly 
changing to avoid detection. Botnet domain can hardly 
become usable and referenced to obtain a large number of 
hits in search engines and the ownership will most likely 
be unknown. Experimental evaluation confirmed better 
classification than the network delay feature. 
Unfortunately, unique classification was not 
accomplished. Both features separately cannot classify 
CDN from Botnet sites. By combining the two features, 
classification is widely improved. New detection 
algorithm is proposed combining network delay and 
domain name credit worthiness. The algorithm advantage 
is the ability to detect Botnet in real time with a small 
memory signature and processing performance, which 
makes it suitable for embedded system. Disadvantage is 
the threshold assessment, which has to be calculated with 
a learning set for a particular implementation. 
In future, we plan to implement this algorithm into 
multiple embedded systems set in different geographic 
locations. The goal is to provide new sets of data from 
different networks. By comparing these sets, a CDN 
behaviour for different local networks can be more 
precisely modelled. Additionally, as there are multiple 
search engines experimental setup can be conducted in 





The authors would like to thank the Central 
Informatics Support staff of Zagreb, University of 




[1] Mockapetris, P. (1987). Domain names – Concepts and 
Facilities. Network Working Group RFC-1034. 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1034 (01.03.2016) 
https://doi.org/10.17487/rfc1034 
[2] Mockapetris, P. (1987). Domain names – Implementation 
and Specification. Network Working Group RFC-1035. 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1035 (01.03.2016) 
https://doi.org/10.17487/rfc1035 
[3] Brisco, T. (1995). DNS Support for Load Balancing. 
Network Working Group RFC-1794. 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1794 (01.03.2016) 
https://doi.org/10.17487/rfc1794 
[4] Hofmann, M.; Leland, R.B. Content Networking 
Architecture, Protocols, and Practice. Morgan Kaufmann 
Publisher, 2005. 
[5] Nygren, E., Ramesh, K. S., & Sun, J. (2010). The Akamai 
Network: A Platform for High-Performance Internet 
Applications. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review, 
44(3). https://doi.org/10.1145/1842733.1842736 
[6] Google Public DNS Frequently Asked Questions: Where 
are your servers currently located?, 
https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/faq, 
(01.03.2016) 
[7] Lee, K. W. (2005). Protecting Content Distribution 
Networks from Denial of Service Attacks. IEEE 
International Conference, 830-836. 
[8] Zlomislić, V., Fertalj, K., & Sruk, V. (2017). Denial of 
service attacks, defences and research challenges. Cluster 
Computing The Journal of Networks, Software Tools and 
Applications, 20(1), 1-11. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10586-017-0730-x 
[9] Ramneek, P. (2013). Bots & Botnet an Overview (PDF). 
SANS Institute https://www.sans.org/reading-room/ 
whitepapers/malicious/bots-Botnet-overview-1299 
(20.02.2016) 
[10] Caglayan, A., Toothaker, M., Drapeau, D., Burke, D., & 
Eaton, G. (2012). Behavioral analysis of Botnets for threat 
intelligence. Information Systems and e-Business 
Management, 830-836. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10257-011-0171-7 
[11] Qi, L. & Zhen, L. (2014). Portfolio optimization of 
computer and mobile Botnets. International Journal of 
Information Security, 13(1), 1-14. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-013-0206-9 
[12] Asghari, H., Eeten, M. J. G., & Bauer, J. M. (2015). 
Economics of Fighting Botnets: Lessons from a Decade of 
Mitigation. IEEE Security & Privacy, 13(5), 16-23. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/MSP.2015.110 
[13] Anagnostopoulos, M., Kambourakis, K., & Gritzali, S.  
(2016). New facets of mobile Botnet: architecture and 
evaluation. International Journal of Information Security. 
15(5), 455-473. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-015-0310-0 
[14] Salusky, W. & Danford, R. (2007). Know Your Enemy: 
Fast-Flux Service Networks Know Your Enemy: Fast-Flux 
Service Networks. The Honeypot project. 
http://www.honeynet.org/papers/ff (04.02.2016) 
[15] Nadji, Y., Antonakakis, M., Perdisci, R., Lee, W., & 
Dagon, D. (2013). Beheading Hydras: Performing Effective 
BotnetTakedowns. 20th ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security, ACM CCS 2013, 121-132. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2508859.2516749 
[16] Scarfone, K. & Mell, P. (2010). Guide to Intrusion 
Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS). Computer 
Security Resource Center (National Institute of Standards 
and Technology). 
[17] Alieyan, K., ALmomani, A., & Manasrah, A. (2015). A 
survey of Botnet detection based on DNS. Neural 
Computing and Applications, 1-18. 
[18] Gajski, D. D., Abdi, S., Gerstlauer, A., & Schirner, G. 
(2009). Embedded System Design - Modeling, Synthesis 
and Verification, Springer US. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0504-8 
[19] Holz, T., Gorecki, C., & Rieck, F. (2008). Measuring and 
detecting fast-flux service networks. Proceedings of the 
Network & Distributed System Security Symposium, 12-22. 
[20] Passerini, E., Paleari, R., Martignoni, L., & Bruschi, D. 
(2008). FluXOR: Detecting and Monitoring Fast-Flux 
Service Networks. Proceedings of the 5th International 
Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and 
Vulnerability Assessment, 186-206. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70542-0_10 
[21] Perdisci, R., Corona. I., Dagon, D., & Lee, W. (2009). 
Detecting Malicious Flux Service Networks through 
Passive Analysis of Recursive DNS Traces. Proceedings of 
the 2009 Annual Computer Security Applications 
Conference, 311-320. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACSAC.2009.36 
[22] Perdisci, R., Corona I., & Giacinto G. (2012). Early 
Detection of Malicious Flux Networks via Large-Scale 
Passive DNS Traffic Analysis. IEEE Transactions on 
Dependable and Secure Computing, 9(5), 714-726. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2012.35 
[23] Nazario, J. & Holz, T. (2008). As the net churns: Fast-flux 
Botnet observations. MALWARE 2008, 3rd International 
Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software, 24-31. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/MALWARE.2008.4690854 
Davor CAFUTA et al.: Fast-Flux Botnet Detection Based on Traffic Response and Search Engines Credit Worthiness 
400                  Technical Gazette 25, 2(2018), 390-400
[24] Hu, X., Knysz, M., & Shin, K. (2011). Measurement and 
analysis of global ipusage patterns of fast-flux Botnets. 
INFOCOM, 2011 Proceedings IEEE, 2633-2641. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2011.5935091 
[25] Hu, X., Knysz, M., & Shin, K. G. (2009). RB-Seeker: 
Auto-detection of Redirection Botnets. In Proc. of 16th 
NDSS. 
[26] Marchal, S., Francois, J., Wagner, C., State, R., Dulaunoy, 
A., Engel, T., &  Festor, O. (2012). DNSSM A large scale 
passive DNS security monitoring framework. Network 
Operations and Management Symposium (NOMS 2012), 
IEEE, 988-993. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/NOMS.2012.6212019 
[27] Bilge, L., Kirda, E., Kruegel, C., & Balduzzi, M. (2014). 
EXPOSURE: Finding Malicious Domains Using Passive 
DNS Analysis. ACM Transactions on Information and 
System Security (TISSEC), 16(4), 1-28. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2584679 
[28] Jehyun, L., Jonghun, K., Hyo-Jeong, S., & Heejo, L. 
(2010). Tracking multiple C&C Botnets by analyzing DNS 
traffic. Secure Network Protocols (NPSec 2010), 6th IEEE 
Workshop on Secure Network Protocols, 67 -72. 
[29] Ching-Hsiang, H., Chun-Ying, H., & Kuan-Ta, C. (2010). 
Fast-flux bot detection in real time. Proceedings of the 13th 
international conference on recent advances in intrusion 
detection, 464-483. 
[30] Yadav, S., Reddy, A., Reddy, A., & Ranjan, S. (2013). 
Detecting Algorithmically Generated Domain-Flux Attacks 
With DNS Traffic Analysis. IEEE-ACM Transaction on 
Networking, 20(1), 1663-1677. 
[31] Pomorova, O., Savenko, O., Lysenko, S., Kryshcuk, A., & 
Bobrovnikova, K. (2015). A Technique for the Botnet 
Detection Based on DNS-Traffic Analysis. Computer 
Networks, Communications in Computer and Information 
Science, 522, 127-138. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19419-6_12 
[32] Truong, D. T., Cheng, G., Jakalan, A., & Guo, X. J. (2016). 
Detecting DGA-Based Botnet with DNS Traffic Analysis 
in Monitored Network. Journal of Internet Technology, 
17(2), 217-230. 
[33] Kwon, J., Lee, K., Lee, H., & Perrig, A. (2016). PsyBoG: A 
scalable Botnet detection method for large-scale DNS 
traffic. Computer Networks, Communications in Computer 
and Information Science, 97, 48-73. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.12.008 
[34] The top sites on the web, Alexa top, 
http://www.alexa.com/topsites/ (2013-2015) 
[35] Tracker, https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/ (2013-2015) 
[36] Tracker, http://www.malwaredomains.com/ (2013-2015) 
[37] Tracker, http://www.malc0de.com/ (2013-2015) 
[38] Tracker: http://www.malwareurl.com/ (2013-2015) 
[39] Tracker: http://www.malwaredomainlist.com/ (2013-2015) 
[40] Tracker: https://spyeyetracker.abuse.ch/ (2013-2015) 
[41] Tracker: http://www.team-cymru.org/ (2013-2015) 
[42] Tracker: http://maliciousnetworks.org/ (2013-2015) 
[43] Tracker: http://www.threatlog.com/search/ (2013-2015) 
[44] Tracker: http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/ 
Stats/Conficker/ (2013-2015) 
[45] Tracker: http://www.abuse.ch/ (2013-2015) 
[46] Tracker: http://www.ipillion.com/ (2013-2015) 
[47] Tracker: https://www.phishtank.com/ (2013-2015) 
[48] Broadley, C. 50 Reasons Your Website Deserves to Be 
PenalizedBy Google. https://blog.kissmetrics.com/ 
penalized-by-google/ (01.05.2015) 
[49] RTALabel: Restricted To Adults. Association of Sites 
Advocating Child Protection (ASACP). 
http://www.rtalabel.org/index.php/ (01.05.2015) 
[50] Google My Business Help: Your business information in 
the Knowledge Panel. Google docs. 
https://support.google.com/business/answer/6331288?hl=e
n\&ref\_topic=4854129/ (01.05.2016) 
[51] Console help: Sitelinks - HTML Improvements report- 
Google docs. https://support.google.com/webmasters/ 
answer/47334?hl=en\&ref \_topic=4589289/ (01.05.2016) 
[52] Jiang, H. & Dovrolis, C. (2002). Passive estimation of TCP 
round-trip times. ACM SIGCOMM Comput. Commun., 
32(3), 75-88. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/571697.571725 
[53] Witten, I. H., Frank, E., & Hall, M. A. (2011). Data 
Mining: Practical Machine Learning Tools and 
Techniques, 3rd Ed. New York, USA: Morgan Kaufmann. 
[54] Hall, M. A., Frank, E., Holmes, G., Pfahringer, B., 
Reutemann, P., & Witten, I. H. (2009). The WEKA data 
mining software: an update. ACM SIGKDD explorations 
newsletter, 11(1), 1018. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/1656274.1656278 
Contact information: 
Davor CAFUTA, M.Sc. 
Zagreb University of Applied Sciences, 
Vrbik 8, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia 
davor.cafuta@tvz.hr 
Vlado SRUK, Associate Professor, PhD 
Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computing, 
University of Zagreb, 
Unska 3, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia 
vlado.sruk@fer.hr 
Ivica DODIG, M.Sc. 
Zagreb University of Applied Sciences, 
Vrbik 8, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia 
ivica.dodig@tvz.hr 
